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Manas Hysteria 
Why the United States can't keep buying off Kyrgyz leaders to keep its 
vital air base open.  
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As the dust settles in Bishkek and Kyrgyzstan's erstwhile opposition begins to assemble a 
new regime to replace ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, U.S. policymakers and 
international pundits remain preoccupied with Manas air base. This facility, located near 
Bishkek, has been an important hub supporting the war effort in Afghanistan since the 
U.S. military opened it in December 2001.  
Since then, Manas's operations have been threatened by political instability more than 
once. Russia, never pleased to have U.S. forces on former Soviet territory, regularly 
pressures Kyrgyzstan to terminate the base's lease. Certainly, the Kremlin had something 
to do with Bakiyev's February 2009 announcement, delivered in Moscow, that he would 
close Manas and accept more than $2 billion in emergency assistance and investments 
from Russia.  
But this explanation neglects how Kyrgyz elites, relatively weak and impoverished, still 
retain considerable ability to manipulate both the United States and Russia for their own 
local political agendas and personal gain. After all, last year the Kyrgyz government 
ended up double-crossing Moscow by accepting an initial $300 million payment before it 
renegotiated a higher rent with the United States for the renamed "Manas Transit Center." 
As a result, relations between Moscow and Bishkek plummeted to an all-time low, while 
Bakiyev's government gleefully cashed in the new checks provided by both Moscow and 
Washington.  
The root of these recurring basing headaches lies in the fact that the United States simply 
lacks the authority to establish a military presence in Central Asia. Unlike basing 
facilities in Japan, South Korea, and Germany, Manas didn't come to the United States in 
the aftermath of a wartime occupation or conflict. Nor do these bases serve the common 
defense or a security organization, like NATO bases in Italy and Turkey.  
Rather, in Kyrgyzstan the United States has to rely on a quid pro quo, usually in the form 
of economic incentives, to secure the ongoing acquiescence of local governments. The 
United States perceives Manas as part of the Afghan theater of operations, and Kyrgyz 
officials typically cite this rationale for the base's existence as well. However, from the 
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outset they have also viewed the U.S. military presence as instrumental in securing a 
significant foreign revenue stream.  
When the base was first established, U.S. officials agreed to pay takeoff and landing fees 
based on international civil aviation standards to the Manas Airport Authority, an entity 
tied to former President Askar Akayev's regime. This unusual arrangement was designed 
to provide Akayev's government with economic incentives to support the coalition effort 
in Afghanistan. Of these local revenue streams, by far the most lucrative remain the 
contracts to supply jet fuel. Indeed, an FBI investigation following Akayev's ouster in 
March 2005 revealed that he and his family members had embezzled funds from these 
fuel contracts and transferred them into overseas bank accounts.  
After Bakiyev assumed office in the wake of the "Tulip Revolution," he criticized these 
Akayev-era arrangements and claimed that future base-related revenues would be used 
for the good of the Kyrgyz nation, not personal profit. They were not -- but Bakiyev 
nonetheless demanded even more rent from Washington. In 2006, he secured a new 
agreement that increased annual rental payments from $2 million to $17 million, within a 
total $150 million annual package of U.S. payments and bilateral assistance. But even 
this did not satisfy the Kyrgyz president, who subsequently engineered the 2009 Russia-
U.S. bidding war that resulted in the tripling of the annual rental payment to $60 million 
and an additional $117 million in aid.  
For the Kyrgyz opposition, excluded from these base-related revenues, Manas became a 
daily reminder of the Bakiyev family's greed, corruption, and use of Kyrgyzstan's state 
assets for their private purposes. Following their rise to power, members of the interim 
government have already signaled their intention to re-evaluate the deals surrounding the 
base. Roza Otunbayeva, the new government's head, stated in a recent news conference 
her intention to investigate the structure of fuel contracts. At issue might be ties between 
the Bakiyev family and the Mina Corporation, which in July 2009 was awarded an annual 
fuel contract worth potentially more than $200 million.  
The Kyrgyz political opposition has also grown to resent Washington's single-minded 
focus on Manas at the expense of human rights issues. The opposition was stunned when 
President Barack Obama personally courted Bakiyev last year in an effort to rescind the 
decision to close Manas; Obama was criticized for jettisoning his democratic values in 
order to curry favor with the repressive Kyrgyz regime.  
The conspicuous U.S. refusal to condemn Bakiyev's July 2009 presidential re-election, an 
election harshly criticized by international observers, further alienated Bakiyev's critics. 
Ironically, Washington's silence can be contrasted with the Russian media's denunciations 
of Bakiyev's corruption and nepotism. Of course, Russia's accusations come out of rivalry 
rather than genuine concern for human rights, but the attacks have nevertheless played 
well among the Kyrgyz public.  
For now, Otunbayeva has indicated that status quo operational arrangements will remain 
in effect for the duration of the basing contract. However, as the base's lease comes up for 
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renegotiation this summer, it is now a certainty that Bishkek will demand to restructure 
the contracts and change the base's legal provisions, if only to demonstrate to a suspicious 
public that all is not "business as usual" at Manas.  
In response, Washington might be tempted to throw even more money at Bishkek: After 
all, it worked in the past.  
But paying off the Kyrgyz is a short-term solution that will backfire in the long term. 
Instead, to protect Manas further down the road, the United States must convince the 
Kyrgyz people that it is interested in more than a transactional relationship. For example, 
the United States can publicly encourage the Kyrgyz interim government to nationalize 
the distribution of fuel to the base, as it has announced it will do with Bakiyev's private 
banks, and to make more transparent base-related payments to the national budget, as 
opposed to paying out to opaque companies with offshore registrations. Of course, U.S. 
officials -- having just witnessed how chronic incompetence can generate the rapid 
collapse of a government -- would also do well to re-engage on issues of governance and 
democracy.  
Simply put, putting an end to the cycle of confrontation over Manas will require that all 
interested parties approach the basing issue differently from before. At the Prague 
summit last week, U.S. and Russian officials declared their willingness to pursue some 
basic cooperation that might avert a new round of Manas-related bidding and competition. 
Such coordination should be encouraged.  
But the United States must also act with greater sensitivity toward the complex role the 
base plays within Kyrgyzstan. For its part, the new Kyrgyz government would do well to 
not only clean up the corrupt flow of base-related funds, but, more importantly, work to 
hasten the day when a U.S. air base is no longer the focus of the country's foreign 
relations and domestic political maneuverings.  
